FRANCE



Vol I No 14

N.Z ARMY CURRENT AFFAIRS BULLETIN

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SUMMARY FOR PLATOON OFFICERS

We are not concerned with the fall of France merely because it brought the British Commonwealth to the supreme crisis of its history. We are concerned with the fall of France for the further and more important reason that it was the collapse of a society which had for half a century been the main stronghold of democracy in Europe. The fall of France shook us not merely because we had lost our ally, but because it raised grave questions about the strength and stability of the democratic system everywhere.

Did French democracy collapse because it had weaknesses not shared by other democracies? Or would our own democracy have crumbled in the same way under the same impact? Were we saved by our own strength or by time and distance? This bulletin does not attempt to supply a full answer to all these questions. It does set out some of the main causes of France's collapse, which is perhaps all that is possible in the present state of our knowledge of recent French history.

In your preliminary talk point out that the ensuing discussion need not be confined to France. The bulletin opens the whole question of the merits and demerits of modern democracies.

———

1. **The Collapse of France. Was it inevitable?**
2. **The Structure of France**
   - (*a*) Area and Communications.
   - (*b*) Natural Resources.
   - (*c*) Population.
   - (*d*) Industry.
   - (*e*) Foreign Trade.
   - (*f*) Social Services.
3. **The Politics of the Third Republic**
   - (*a*) The Constitution of 1875.
   - (*b*) Presidential Election.
   - (*c*) The Senate.
   - (*d*) The Chamber of Deputies.
   - (*e*) Cabinet.
   - (*f*) Presidential powers.
   - (*g*) Government *v.* Chamber.

[*Continued on last page*

These bulletins are not official statements. They are compiled from published sources and intended to provide the starting point for group discussions.

FRANCE

On June 14, 1940, ten months after Great Britain and France had declared war on Germany, the German troops entered Paris. Six days later the Armistice with Germany was signed.

To some people the French defeat came as such a shock that its causes are still a complete mystery; to others, the collapse came as less of a shock. These professed themselves, by pointing to the corruption of French politics, to have foreseen the event. But simply because the fall of France has happened, that its happening can be rationally explained, does not mean that it was likely to happen.

For example, was it possible for France to have continued the war after the fall of Paris? The answer is yes, provided, as one observer says, France was in a truly heroic mood. It would have meant sacrifices and fearful risks. The only chance was to have continued the war in North Africa. But that would have meant that European France would have been left entirely in German hands, and the Germans would not have scrupled to have used the most fearful black-mail on the Government of North Africa and the soldiers and sailors there. It was a price the French Government was not willing to pay. The British offer to form a joint Government with France was rejected. President Roosevelt was unable to offer more than increased supplies. It was clear that the end had come when, on the fall of Paris, Premier Reynaud cabled to President Roosevelt that unless the United States could offer France the certainty of promptly entering the war "the fate of the world will change" and "you will see France go under like a drowning man and disappear after having cast a long last look towards the land of liberty from which was awaited salvation." But, as a poet once said, "'Tis true there's better booze than brine, but he that drowns must drink it."

We shall have to look further than this if we are to uncover in the political, social, and economic structure of pre-war France the causes of her ultimate defeat. Embedded there lie the causes of decay. Moreover, the economic and human resources of the Third Republic, and the way in which those resources were used, are data which underlie any estimate of France now, and of the place of France in the post-war world.

What was the economic, political, and social structure of France when Poland was attacked and war was declared on Germany?

Area and Communications

The area of metropolitan France is twice that of New Zealand, but its physical shape is more compact. No two points, for example, are as far apart as Invercargill and Whangarei. This has meant that, though many of the chief towns are border or coastal towns, France was able to achieve, politically and economically, a high degree of centralization. Since the days of Louis XIV the highways system

has webbed the country with well-kept trunk roads. In 1933 there were 50,000 miles of national roads and some 350,000 miles of minor roads. Besides these, over 6,000 miles of inland waterways were in use by 1930. Since then many important new canals have been constructed. Railways before the war had been greatly improved, and many of them had been electrified. All roads and railways led to Paris, the centre of political, administrative, academic, and social life. Here, too, lay an important part of the nation's industrial activity.

Natural Resources

France is rich in some minerals. Before 1939 the output of bauxite was the largest in the world, that of iron-ore was between 20 and 30 per cent. of world production. France was also the world's second biggest producer of potash, a leading producer of superphosphates, basic slag, sulphuric acids, nickel, chromium, graphite, and molybdenum. Although railways and industry had been extensively electrified, coal deposits supplied only two-thirds of the annual consumption. Britain usually supplied the deficiency.

Agriculture

French soil has great agricultural potentialities. Before the war France grew five times as much wheat as Britain and nearly sixty times as much as New Zealand, over twice as much oats as the United Kingdom and one hundred and twenty times as much as New Zealand, three times as much potatoes as the former, and over one hundred times as much as the latter. New Zealand produced nearly four times as much, and Britain three times as much, mutton as France. Britain and France produced about the same amount of beef and a little more than New Zealand. France produced eleven times, and New Zealand nine times, as much butter as Britain.

Population

Three hundred years ago the French nation made up one-fifth of the total population of Europe; before the present war it constituted less than one-twelfth, and of this twelfth, according to the 1931 census, one in twelve was a foreigner or a naturalized foreigner. During the nineteenth century the rest of Europe greatly increased its population, but France did not achieve any spectacular growth. The French birth-rate was declining in pre-war years, and the population of France in 1939 was just over 40,000,000. The birth-rate of France is still falling, while the average age of the population is steadily rising: at the last census 14 per cent. of the French were aged sixty and upwards, which made France the most elderly nation on earth.

At the last census half the population of France was classed as rural, of which 35 per cent. was occupied in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. French heavy industry was largely engaged round the important iron-ore deposits in the north. Greater Paris accounted for 6,400,000 inhabitants.

COMPARATIVE PRODUCTION



Distribution of Industry

Factory industry employed 7,000,000 workers in 500,000 plants. It is interesting to compare the figures for Great Britain: 8,400,000 workers were employed in 250,000 factories. But in France industry ran to extremes: there were 57,000 factories with no paid employees, nearly 400,000 with from one to five, and fourteen great plants with an average of nearly 10,000 workers each. There were hardly any medium-sized independent firms manufacturing both for the home market and for export such as there are in Great Britain, which have been the back-bone of British industry. The greatest factory industries in France were concerned with clothing, engineering, building, baking, and pastrycook trades. The largest group of industries was metals, accounting for 1,600,000 workers, then clothing (1,000,000), next textile (slightly less than a million), constructional industries (890,000), and woodworking (650,000).

Foreign Trade

Pre-war exports, with the exception of iron-ore, pig-iron, steel, and some agricultural products to Great Britain, were mostly luxury goods such as wines, spirits, and textiles.

Nearly 60 per cent. of French imports came in raw, while about 20 per cent. had undergone some processing. Highly-processed goods represented rather more than 20 per cent. of French imports. Half French exports, however, fell into this category. Most of the French Colonial trade was carried by French vessels. The mercantile marine was capable of carrying up to two-thirds of French sea-borne exports and over a third of French sea-borne imports. It included a trawler fleet second only to the British. There was also a large overland trade. The French commercial air service was among the world's most important.

Social Security Services

In 1931 compulsory social insurance for sickness, maternity, invalidity, widows', orphans', and old-age pensions was established for all workers in industry, commerce, and domestic service below an income limit which varied according to size of family. A separate scheme for agricultural workers was introduced in 1934. The schemes were financed by workers' and employers' contributions, to which a State subsidy was added. There was no compulsory insurance against unemployment. The proposal of the Popular Front in 1937 to introduce a national unemployment relief service financed by the Treasury was never put into effect. All employees contributed to "equalization funds" which paid allowances—varying in amount in different areas and occupations—in respect of every child of every employed worker. It was a complex system and was overhauled in 1939.

These are just some of the facts about French economic and human resources. In terms of national income, how were they used?

Colin Clark has calculated the national income of France for 1934 at 216 milliard francs, or 11,380 francs per occupied person. He

compares this with a national income in 1911 of 246 milliard francs, or 13,910 per occupied person, and says that in France there appeared to "have been an almost complete cessation of economic growth since the beginning of the present century." There is no doubt that the French standard of living was, in some respects, poor. Standard of living normally varies inversely with the consumption of bread: New Zealand, before the war, consumed an average of 4 bushels of wheat per head a year, while the French ate 6.2 per head. Housing conditions were often poor, and in rural districts sanitation was unsatisfactory. But it is well to remember that national standards of living are difficult to compare. And there were ways in which France set a standard of her own which was the envy of the world.

The Politics of the Third Republic

Keeping in mind the fate of the Third Republic, we will examine the French political system and discover why, against the impact of war, it gave way.

The constitution of 1875 was the result of a compromise between a Monarchist majority and a Republican minority. If the powerful groups of Monarchists could have agreed, there might perhaps to-day have been a King on the throne of France. The 1875 constitution was made to fill a gap. M. Halevy suggests that it was only fear that made the Republicans and the Monarchists of the Assembly come to a decision on a plan for the constitution, fear of what both Left and Right hated more than they hated one another—the Empire and the Bonaparte dynasty. The constitution was the work of disillusioned Royalists and Conservative Republicans allowed to do their necessary but unimpressive best with the aid of the votes, if not the voices of the people.

In contrast to the constitution of 1791 or 1848, the Legislators of 1875 did not record any similar philosophy to the Declaration of Rights, and restricted themselves to working out the formal structure of a machinery of Government. The constitution accepted the principle of universal male suffrage, but was, on the whole, backward-looking in the sense that it was concerned to *prevent* situations that had arisen in the past. So that the framers of the constitution having in mind the 1849 presidential election when Louis Napoleon was elected by plebiscite, provided for indirect election of the President of the Republic: the Chamber and Senate had to form themselves into a National Assembly to choose the President, whose term of office was fixed for seven years.

The Senate (corresponding to our Legislative Council), whose members had to be over forty years of age, was to be elected by electoral colleges in each department. The greatest city and the tiniest village were equal, so the average rural commune was given fuller representation than the greatest urban centres. Disproportionate political weight therefore was given to the landowners. The very strong position of the Senate tended to give the Third Republic a very strong conservative, and even reactionary, tendency. Each representative was elected for nine years, one-third of the members

being elected every three years. The function of the Senate was (as with our Legislative Council) clearly one of revising and delaying. But there was this important difference : in France the delay could become permanent. The constitution did not provide for solving a deadlock between Senate and Chamber. Women suffrage, for example, has repeatedly been accepted by the Chamber and turned down by the Senate. The Senate was very powerful and could force a Government to resign.

The Chamber of Deputies was elected by manhood suffrage for a term of four years.

Supreme executive powers in France (as in New Zealand) were vested in the Cabinet, which was collectively responsible to Parliament (Ministers were drawn from both Senate and Chamber), and a Government no longer having the confidence of the Chamber resigned.

French Presidents were expected to be, and usually were, neutral in character, keeping aloof from party antagonism. In France, once an individual holds power, he becomes suspect. For, inherent in French individualism, lies the conviction that " it is the nature of authority to abuse power."

When we compare the authority, the very real power, the President of the United States exercises, with the powers of the President of France, we can see that in time of crises, when authority is needed, the people of the United States, unlike the French, do not look in vain for leadership.

It might be asked why in that case the French could not have found leadership and authority in the person of their Premier—the leader of the political majority. For the same reason—fear of the concentration of power in the hands of one person. Let us make another comparison. In the British parliamentary system, if the Lower House votes against the Government on a major issue, either the Opposition takes office or there is a dissolution of Parliament. Once a situation is reached where no Government has a clear majority dissolution is inevitable. In France, however many Governments came and went, the Chamber sat securely for its term of four years. Generally speaking, therefore, the Chamber controlled the Government. This is very different from the relationship between the Lower House and the Government in the British parliamentary system. If the Lower House defeats the Government, there will probably be an election, which will involve the private member in expense and may cost him his seat. The normal desire of the private member to avoid too frequent elections gives the Government, under the British parliamentary system, a powerful weapon with which to control the Lower House. In France the Minister is insecure because he can be turned out of office without any consequent danger to the private member (except the discrediting of parliamentary Government which was the result of this misuse of power).

The helplessness of Governments in face of the Chamber gave rise to one of the most serious problems of parliamentary Government in France—that is, the lack of continuity of Governments, and



By the armistice the western and northern French coast, and all French territory north of a line drawn from Tours–through Bourges–Moulins–Dôle–to Geneva, were placed under German occupation. All French Armed Forces were to be demobilized and disarmed except for a small force permitted to remain in being in the unoccupied southern area. All artillery, tanks, munitions, and aircraft, and all fortifications and naval yards were to be handed over intact. The French fleet was also to be recalled to French waters, and there disarmed and interned under German and Italian control.

their inability, in view of their short life, to put into effect any long-range policy.

A fact fundamental to any understanding of French politics was the centralization of the administrative machinery. The Prefects of the Départements were appointed and controlled by the Central Government in Paris. We in New Zealand have nothing to correspond to this functionary. Each Prefect in his Département (there were ninety of them) controlled almost all the spheres of activity that are administered by our local bodies. The Prefect, for example, appointed all local employees of the Government—postmen, constables, elementary-school teachers—and he controlled the various State services within the Département. From this it can be seen that French democracy has lacked the local self-government and local administration which are so important in New Zealand, Great Britain, and the United States.

The large-scale organized industrial and banking interests were also highly centralized and were able to frustrate the working of democracy by silently braking the machinery of the French State.

Party Politics

Although there were more than forty political groupings before the war, the pivots of French politics have been mainly Monarchism, the more conservative Republicanism and the less conservative Radicalism, and Socialism. Party discipline was slack. Governments were usually coalitions. There is no doubt that Government in France even in times of national crisis, was weak and unstable; thus democracy became, when finally challenged, an easy prey to reaction.

For all its faults and falseness, the French political system might have continued to permit the development of the humane, critical, rich French civilization, and not have done irremediable harm, if France had been, let us say, an island more isolated than New Zealand is from the stormy outside world. But France was a neighbour of Germany. The Third Republic, in spite of all its weaknesses, still stood in most people's minds for a liberal conception of life that, as the years closed in on 1940, was being everywhere threatened.

These are some of the facts about the France which was attacked by Germany for the third time in a century.

France had been the victor in 1918. But, intrinsically, for the purposes of modern war, France was hopelessly inferior to her formidable neighbour.

In spite of the great wastages of the 1914–18 war, France had, with the great natural advantages which we have discussed, on the whole preserved her old self-sufficiency. But in comparison with other major Powers, she suffered from a stationary population, from agricultural maladjustment, and from industrial and commercial under-development. Standards of living, judged by a conventional yardstick, were not as high as those of other advanced countries.

The Impact of War

We spoke earlier of the logic of events. We can see now, from the short-term viewpoint, that there were several distinct collapses in 1940 :—

(1) The Military Collapse : The break-through at Sedan was immediately due to German superiority in equipment, technique, and generalship. This might have been merely a lost battle if it had not been followed by,

(2) Collapse of Morale : The nation was totally unprepared for a defeat, and the shock of this, combined with the complete disorganization of life and the rumours that the British were saving themselves, made some sections of French opinion believe that further resistance was hopeless. It is not unlikely that had the nation been given earlier and more united leadership and had not collapsed through civilian panic, the Army would have reformed and continued its physical resistance ; but

(3) The political collapse prevented this. The Third Republic was abandoned at Bordeaux. Unity and authority were gone.

The long-term causes of these different collapses (which in a country of traditions and history different from France might have been brought about purely by a military defeat) must now be analysed :—

(1) In the first world war France lost one and a half million men, and had the same number permanently disabled. The French were determined never to experience such losses again. French thought and policy were impelled by this dominating idea during the inter-war years. The British Commonwealth and the United States, geographically secure, and with war losses proportionately not as great as the French, could not share fully the French anxiety.

French foreign policy in its various forms, did consistently pursue peace as a means of ensuring security. Britain, no less than France, wished to preserve peace, but it is unfortunate that their ideas as to how this should be done were rarely the same at the same time. Neither country attempted before the war to set up the machinery for joint defence and attack which might have been the result of a common outlook on political problems and military needs. The Maginot Line and a system of Eastern alliances turned out to be a sad substitute for a vigorous Anglo-French entente.

(2) French economic policy had for long been partly subordinated to defence needs. To provide man-power for a first-rate army, of which the peasants were the mainstay, uneconomic wheat and sugar production was subsidized. The over-centralized colonial policy had the same object in view. General de Gaulle had been one of the few to see that this policy would fail to deliver the goods. When the test

came the mass army of peasants and colonial troops proved no match for tanks and aircraft operated by far fewer men. The result would probably have been the same if the French peasant army had been twice as big. French economic policy had penalized for the sake of the peasantry the industries which might have made France strong. In modern war industrial potential is even more important than man-power.

Political

Although France was by all its traditions the main sword and the main shield of democracy in Europe, French democratic institutions had not been carried to their full logical degree of development, and their practice led not rarely into corruption and open self-seeking; the political awareness of French men and women was acute but vacillating, and focussed on immediate local interests and not on the world or Europe as a whole. To choose one or other line of action—support of the Weimar Republic or, when that failed, to face the realities of Hitlerian Revolution—was to commit the French State to one resolute policy, carried out without flinching, without compromise. But at home and abroad the Third Republic, as we have seen, had lost all power to carry out any coherent, long-termed policy.

In the crisis of June, 1940, what was lacking to set against a natural popular resentment and despair was *political* authority. The Generals were chess-players who knew that they had lost. But, as Mr. Churchill has shown us, the art of war is more than a military art, and statesmen of authority might have countered the despair of soldier and civilian. They might have estimated, more justly, the power and will of Britain to resist. They might have estimated more justly the possibilities of French imperial resistance. Above all, they might have denounced that pathetic belief in an honourable peace "between soldiers"—that blind refusal of Marshal Pétain to see the Nazi revolution as it really was. It was just this independent political authority that was lacking. But this should be stated quite clearly and emphatically: In spite of "inside" stories of the fall of France, even a few written by Frenchmen, there is hardly sufficient evidence to assume that there was, except in narrow circles, a premeditated treason or a spontaneous welcome for German victory. Until the breach of the Somme-Aisne line the Government, at least the majority, do not seem to have contemplated capitulation.

The Armistice

Under the terms of the armistice of Compiegne, France was disarmed both militarily and economically. Out of ninety departments, forty-three were fully and eleven partially occupied; 25,000,000 out of a total population (excluding Alsace and Lorraine) of 38,000,000 live in occupied, and only 13,000,000, in unoccupied France.

Occupation costs, at first 400,000,000 francs a day, later 300,000,000 francs a day, were very high and their payment has entailed inflation.

The exchange rate greatly favoured the Nazis, who were able to buy French stocks and capital assets at a minimum cost to themselves. German control of French banking, with its large interests in French industry, has tightened Germany's grasp on industry, particularly on heavy industry.

In some war industries there has actually been an increased production. At the same time consumers' goods industries have been starved of resources. France's industry, in short, is geared to the German war machine.

The railway system was at first hampered by transfers of rolling-stock to Germany. Recently, however, those parts that serve collaboration have been improved.

Traffic on roads and canals has remained almost at a standstill for lack of petrol and lubricants.

Agriculture has suffered from lack of man-power, fertilizers, machinery, live-stock, and seeds. Production has dropped heavily. For example, instead of the pre-war average of 8,000,000 tons of wheat, 6,500,000 tons were grown in 1941.

Effects on Population

About 1,500,000 men between twenty and forty years of age have been held prisoner in Germany; this number was originally greater, but from 200,000 to 300,000 were sent back to work on the land or in the mines of occupied France. Retention of French prisoners has been a means of blackmail as well as a bait for good behaviour. Against this, civilians have been sent in large numbers to work in German factories; according to the *Economist*, 166,000 French workers (metal and building industries) had been drafted to Germany by August 1, 1942, when the estimated rate of transfer was 5,000 per week.

In 1940 the French death-rate was 43 per cent. higher for those over sixty than in 1939, 22 per cent. higher for those between fifteen and sixty, and 10 per cent. higher for infants. The birth-rate fell by 8.5 per cent.

France to-day is undoubtedly chronically undernourished. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that it is being rapidly reduced to the status of a Balkan country. Certainly the extent and magnitude of the reconstruction problems will be enormous. But while France must be recreated by Frenchmen, the effort can succeed only if it is remade in the closest touch and harmony with others of like mind in other countries. The fulfilment of the Atlantic Charter will need intimate and constant collaboration. Without France as an interpreter and partner in bringing Atlantic Charter conceptions into Europe, its principles would be gravely endangered.

The French will recover their liberties and their pride, but they are hardly likely to embody them in the political and economic system the last years of which are the theme of this bulletin.

THE FUTURE OF FRANCE

From an article by Professor PAUL VAUCHER in *The Contemporary Review*, October, 1942

To-day it is impossible to say what kind of Government will succeed the Vichy regime. The demand for a strong Executive when liberation is obtained or when France again enters into the war is obvious. The need for giving the citizens means to express their opinion and to choose their own future is also recognized. But how can trusted leaders come into power? And where are they to be found? We can safely admit that, except for a very small minority which will have in advance committed political suicide, the French people are going to greet General de Gaulle with enthusiasm. However, those who stayed in France, building up the resistance at home, will rightly expect places of responsibility. They had so far little opportunity for training or even for making themselves known. But in the many secret organizations fighting for resistance, in the surviving trade-unions, the remnants of political parties, the papers secretly printed and circulated, in numerous groups formed by men of all parties and of every origin, the problems of the future are considered. The links that Fighting France is striving to establish with such groups may lead to the formation of a team whose authority the country may be prepared to accept.

Freedom and Discipline—the Dilemma

This is all that can be said. Nor can we derive from books and studies a picture of the political institutions that would meet the expectation of the country. Obviously Frenchmen do not hold definite views on the subject. It appears that they are not prepared to repeat the experiences made under a disappointing parliamentary system. At the same time, they want their political liberties to be fully restored. How it is possible to reconcile both requirements remains to be found. Free representative institutions must nevertheless allow a strong and stable Executive to govern. It is presently suggested that the President should no longer be elected by Parliament and that Ministers should not be made responsible towards it. The French Republic would thus come nearer the American model. But the importation of American institutions in France has raised many difficulties in the past, and a similar mood of Americanism that was in fashion for a while during the preceding war did not last.

Suggested Reforms

France is probably much better suited to English parliamentary methods. We should thus fall back on a political regime not very different from the one of the Third Republic, with a Cabinet of Ministers responsible towards a House elected by universal suffrage. Of course, such reforms as were widely favoured in the years 1934–35 would come into force, and some others are likely to be added. The President might be elected by a wider suffrage or even by the whole body of citizens. He should be able to appeal to the country, because the dissolution of Parliament tends to reduce Ministerial instability. The rules of parliamentary procedure could be amended

so as to make the encroachments on the privileges of the Executive less harmful. The electoral law should at last give the women a vote. Steps might be taken to prevent the conclusion of electoral alliances between groups or parties not truly prepared to promote in Parliament a common policy, and also to ascertain that a small majority or, as sometimes happened, a minority of the electorate cannot monopolize power because of an unfair allocation of the parliamentary seats.

Weakness of Political Parties

Let us, however, admit that such changes would not provide an adequate remedy to the main defect of which our political life has been suffering. This undoubtedly lies in the weakness of our political parties and the subsequent absence of a strong leadership. How could political parties become less numerous and better organized? No satisfactory answer to the question can presently be found in the fields of politics, but by considering the social aspects of the problem some further progress may be made.

Two Contradictory Tendencies

French society has undergone profound transformations during the interval between the two wars, and not enough attention has been paid to the contradictory tendencies whose effects were felt at the time. On the one hand there were many signs of weariness or even exhaustion produced by the awful losses sustained in human lives, the enormous material destructions, and a dangerous financial crisis. As a result the Government became simultaneously dependent upon two different electoral bodies, that of the political voters and that of the subscribers to the short-term bonds which the Treasury was issuing. But at the same time France witnessed an unprecedented increase in her economic activities. The boom period, which was short lived in Great Britain, lasted much longer in France, and was not only due to artificial or unhealthy conditions. With the vast resources in iron and steel that the return of Lorraine made available, with her northern industries making use of a new and modernized equipment, with the important additions of the textile factories and the oilfields of Alsace, heavy industres made quick progress. There was a sudden increase in industrial and commercial concentration, with the main banking corporations also spreading branches all over the country. Even the well-known individualism of Frenchmen was giving way as associations of all kinds were formed everywhere.

Lack of Political Foresight

The combined effects of such changes are not easy to analyse. They gave rise to a popular demand for social reforms which our politicians found most embarrassing. But, more important, the new leaders in command of the great business concerns were not prepared to understand the political and social implications of the recent developments. They badly blundered on the monetary issues, and they got so much absorbed in safeguarding themselves against an eventual social revolution that, even more than the man in the street, they failed to see what the growth of aggressive dictatorship in Europe meant to all.

4. Party Politics
Its weaknesses.

5. The Fall of France—
Short-term Causes—
(*a*) Military.
(*b*) Morale.
(*c*) Political.
Long-term Causes—
(*a*) 1914-18 Losses.
(*b*) Misdirected Economic Policy.
(*c*) Irresolution of French Foreign Policy.

6. The Armistice

7. Effects of German Occupation

AIDS TO DISCUSSION

1. Test your platoon's knowledge of France by asking what they know of Madame Curie, Blériot, Dreyfus, Clemenceau, General Giraud, Zola, Briand, General de Gaulle, Reynaud, Laval, Blum.

2. Just before Marshal Pétain asked Germany for an armistice, Mr. Churchill suggested a political union between Britain and France. Should this proposal be renewed after the war?

3. What do you think would have happened if the French Government had refused to make terms with Germany?

4. Do you think any or all of the weaknesses of French democracy in 1939 were shared by other democracies?

5. Why is French the principal modern language taught in New Zealand schools?

6. One writer asks why France fell and supplies this answer: "Because the French people were hypnotized by their low birth-rate, because their Maginot Line had imprisoned their army; because, ignorant of the character and intentions of their enemy, they did not know why they had to fight the Germans and so preferred to fight among themselves; because they had no Churchill; because they were betrayed by a powerful group of their leaders; because of their debased and venal press." Is this a just analysis?

GUIDE TO READING

"Is Tomorrow Hitler's?" Knickerbocker. Penguin.
"The Development of Modern France." Brogan.
"The Twilight of France." Werth.
"The French Political Scene." Dorothy Pickles.

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E. V. PAUL, Government Printer, Wellington.